Beyond the Whispers: Analysis, Methodology and Pekingology

“Do you know what they say about rumors? They’re all true.”

Recently, a dizzying array of rumors about Chinese politics and Xi Jinping has emerged, with narratives ranging from Tom Clancy-style thrillers to whimsical tales reminiscent of Charlie and the Chocolate Factory.

Yet, many eagerly dive down these rabbit holes of speculation and conspiracy. Bill Bishop’s latest podcast criticized this phenomenon, and other articles have debunked these rumors

Here I want to go beyond these whispers. By drawing on insights from seasoned China experts, I want to discuss how we can approach analysis correctly. If a deluge of rumors becomes the new normal, how should we build an analytical framework to process them appropriately? And beyond chasing whispers, how can we acquire reliable, nuanced signals and interpret them accurately?

How to Approach Rumors

First, let's consider how to view rumors. Jonathan Czin, a former NSC Director for China and CIA analyst at the Brookings Institution, shared his perspective at a Sinocism Live event in March. Amidst rumors of He Weidong's purge, he offered two key points when asked about how to interpret such whispers and their potential implications:

• It's not just about paying attention to the source; more importantly, it’s about analyzing whether rumors make sense in this context.

• Conduct thought experiments beforehand and categorize information in detail, establishing a prior framework rather than engaging in post-hoc analysis of recent events.

We must acknowledge that Chinese politics is a black box. However, the opacity of the system should not be an excuse for analytical complacency. We need to think more deeply. When analyzing public texts, prioritize understanding them within their broader context. When considering personnel changes, focus on the operating logic of the system and decision-maker, rather than mere intersections of time, place, and individuals.

Building a Sound Analytical Framework

This leads to the second question: how do we establish a reasonable analytical framework? Martin Petersen, former No.3 guy at the CIA and an accomplished China analyst, proposed a practical and reliable framework based on the CIA's experience analyzing the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown:

When analysis goes wrong, it's generally because one of three things happens:

1. We don't understand the organization that we're trying to analyze.

2. We don't understand the individuals in that organization who are making the decisions.

3. We don't understand our own analysis.

A set of questions needs to be mull over continuously:

1. With the organization:

• How do you get to the top?

• What's the preferred method of exercising power and making decisions?

• What are acceptable and unacceptable uses of power?

2. With individuals:

• How do they assess the situation?

• How do they see their options?

• What is their tolerance for risk?

• What do they believe about intentions, capabilities, and will?

• What's their definition of an acceptable outcome?

3. With our analysis:

• Where am I most vulnerable?

• What am I not seeing that I should be seeing if my line of analysis is correct?

• The big one. Always alarm when you say: it makes no sense for them to do that. It's a good indication that you don't understand the organization you're trying to analyze or the people who are running it.

Applying the Framework to China Analysis

The third question is how to apply this framework to China analysis.

Many, when encountering news about China, often remark that the CCP's economic policies are misguided or that their diplomatic approaches will backfire. This often falls into the pitfalls mentioned above.

So, how should we think? If we think certain Chinese actions don't make sense, we should reflect on whether we are viewing them from a Western or a conventional wisdom perspective, rather than from the leadership's viewpoint. Asking the following questions can help clarify our thinking:

• What do they know that we don't? Classified internal reports, internal data, backchannel communications?

• How do they assess the situation in ways we haven't considered? Dialectical materialist thinking, pure power politics?

• What might be interfering with their assessment? Overconfidence, paranoia about risk, preference for specific viewpoints?

The more correct questions we ask using this analytical framework, the closer we get to a proper understanding.

Practical Application: A Rumor Analysis

Let's briefly apply this framework to a recent rumor: the June 30 Politburo meeting's deliberation of the "Regulations on the Work of the Central Party Decision-Making and Deliberation Coordination Bodies," which some suggested would limit Xi's power.

How can we analyze this from the perspectives of the organization, individuals, and analysis itself?

Organization: The CCP is a Leninist party. The essence of a Leninist party is the supreme leader's control over levers of power, which in this context includes these very institutions. Rules within a Leninist system are manipulable levers for the leader, to be used or discarded as political necessity dictates.

Individual: For Xi, it's absurd to suggest the Party's actions are constrained by the constitution, laws, or some external oversight, and by the same logic, it's heretical to claim internal Party rules can limit the supreme leader's behavior.

From his Leninist viewpoint, if rules or norms bind the Party General Secretary, it either means the Party is flawed and needs rectifying, or that person is not the true supreme leader—which, to him, also signals the Party is flawed and needs rectifying.

Xi's common method of exercising power is by breaking rules. A greater display of dominance is breaking rules himself while imposing their limits on others, such as with the "seven up, eight down" rule at the 20th Party Congress, where he made exceptions for his own people but forced others into retirement. As Shakespeare put it, "It's a custom more honored in the breach than the observance."

Analysis: This interpretation fails to recognize that Xi has precisely utilized these institutions to reshape the regime's decision-making ecosystem. The tools previously used to analyze CCP collective leadership, such as factional analysis and institutionalization theories, are now less useful or even outdated.

Mastering this analytical framework helps us quickly filter out irrelevant information while enhancing our understanding of the big picture.

Pekingology: A Resurgent Discipline

Beyond these methodologies, to gain more valuable insights, we need to rediscover and refine traditional Pekingology.

Alice Miller, a leading China expert, has emphasized the need for China analysis to "return to The Way of the Ancients." In 2018 article for China Leadership Monitor, "Valedictory: Analyzing The Chinese Leadership In An Era Of Sex, Money, And Power," and 2024 report, "Studying China in the Absence of Access: Rediscovering a Lost Art," Miller underscored the importance of Pekingology, which thrived in the 1960s-70s, and its renewed value in Xi's "New Era."

The core premise of Pekingology is the Party's use of media as a policy tool. Internal media serves for policymaking and deliberation, providing "news," while public media explains policy and mobilizes popular support for its execution, conveying the "Party's line." In other words, external propaganda is "the party needs to talk to itself," whereas internal reference is "the party needs to discuss candidly." Internal media once even reflected party line debates, but not in the "new era." Therefore, nuanced media analysis and careful data mining retain irreplaceable, enduring value.

The essence of Pekingology is "hermeneutics." It heavily relies on the analyst's experience, judgment, and understanding of Chinese political culture and discourse. Researchers require profound background knowledge and must cross-verify information from multiple sources to navigate the challenges of information opacity.

Classical Pekingology, when combined with AI, satellite imagery, and open-source intelligence, can yield deeper insights. It's like shifting from gold mining to rare earth extraction: information acquisition is more challenging, analysis demands are higher, but the potential value is greater.

Nevertheless, the most crucial element remains on the ground, face-to-face contact and experience, which are irreplaceable.

Pekingology in Practice: Xi's "Original Words"

Xi often uses colloquial language and vivid metaphors in his remarks. Given his unchallenged authority, officials below him may fear being accused of deviating from his directives. Consequently, when relaying Xi's instructions, sometimes they might quote his internal speeches, directives, or annotations verbatim. As if to ensure no one misses it, these "original words" are occasionally highlighted with quotation marks in official documents, propaganda articles, and the remarks of officials.

Considering that Xi's linguistic style in some way diverges from traditional Party language, this presents a unique analytical window. If we meticulously analyze official discourse—especially local documents and officials' statements—we might identify his specific phrasing based on our understanding of Xi. This may allow us to discern his "original words". From these insights, we can gain a better picture of Xi's way of thinking, his views on particular issues over time, and whether these views are evolving.

A caveat is necessary here: this analytical method has its limitations. The appearance of colloquial expressions in official discourse can have multiple explanations. For instance, it might be an attempt to enhance propaganda effectiveness or to mimic the leader's style, rather than an authoritative reflection of Xi's personal views. Media practices may have changed. Without sufficient diligence, there's a risk of over-interpretation or misdirection

Case Study: "Smash Pots and Sell Steel" and the Economic Policy Shift

The term 'Smash pots and sell steel' (砸锅卖铁), used in quotation marks and meaning 'Sell Everything to Save the Day,' first appeared in an official State Council document at the end of 2023. This document named 12 provinces, urging them to fully resolve local debt risks and strictly control government projects. This move followed the Politburo's July 2023 meeting, which first called for "effectively preventing and resolving local debt risks, and formulating a comprehensive debt-resolution plan." It prompts the intriguing question of whether Xi himself used this colloquial phrase on some occasions to emphasize the resolve to tackle local debt through a method he permitted: the disposal and revitalization of state assets.

Under central directives and immense debt pressure, "Smash-and-Sell Task Forces" were established across many regions starting in 2023, with the idiom widely adopted in local documents. By the second half of 2024, some documents containing this keyword began to leak, and by late August, the term surged in popularity on Chinese social media, garnering attention from foreign and some domestic media. From late September, the CCP made significant economic policy adjustments, providing more fiscal support to local governments, which led to a stock market surge. Subsequently, the appearance of "Smash pots and sell steel" in official discourse noticeably declined.

This raises some questions: Why did a term found in a State Council document and local documents from the previous year (i.e., internal communications noted in media analysis) suddenly erupt in public discourse on China's highly controlled internet and media (i.e., external propaganda) by late August?

Was this accidental or intentional? If accidental, did the timing of the public complaints signal that local finances had reached a tipping point—a "red light" for the economy—presaging a policy inflection point?

If (big if) the public discussion was tolerated, indulged, or even deliberately guided by propaganda apparatus, what does that imply? Was it an active agenda-setting move, preparing for the Politburo meeting in late September that broke from the usual cycle to discuss the economy, a type of meeting that typically requires weeks of preparation?

Are we witnessing a similar signaling pattern to the end of the "dynamic zero-COVID" policy? Back then, the initial signals to end the zero-COVID came after the 20th Party Congress in early November 2022, when local officials and media articles began emphasizing that lockdowns should not be excessive.

Can the rise and fall of "Smash pots and sell steel" be analogized to the term "Houses are for living in, not for speculation" (房住不炒), revealing a new pattern in policy shift decision-making and implementation?

There's more to explore, but my analysis will pause here.

For those interested in similar thought experiments, consider analyzing this case:

After Trump announced the Liberation Day tariffs on April 2, the phrase "Give him an inch and he'll take a mile" (得寸进尺) appeared more frequently in official discourse.

Examples include:

1. Niu Tanqin (a Xinhua News Agency media account) on April 5th

2. Former Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin on April 9th

3. Beijing Daily's revisiting of 'On Protracted War' on April 28th

4. Foreign Minister Wang Yi on April 29th

For true fans of "On Protracted War," you can also take a look at a Hunan Daily article from 2019 with the same title as the Beijing Daily piece, which was republished by Xinhua at that time.

I look forward to your analyses.

Counter-Pekingology: Beijing's Response to Shifting Paradigms

No one understands Pekingology better than those within Zhongnanhai.

Bill raised an interesting question on his podcast: Who benefits from these current rumors? Could they lead the U.S. to misjudge China as weak, resulting in erroneous actions? This question warrants careful consideration.

I would argue that rumors and secrets are two sides of the same coin.

As the great sinologist Pierre Ryckmans (aka Simon Leys) once remarked about the Communist Party:

"The Communist party is in essence a secret society. In its methods and mentality it presents a striking resemblance to an underworld mob. It fears daylight, feeds on deception and conspiracy, and rules by intimidation and terror."

The CCP is a party that places extreme importance on secrecy, viewing it as a source of strength. "Guard the Party's secrets, never betray the Party" is an oath for all members. Slogans like "Secrecy ensures victory" are ubiquitous in military barracks, and they regard the information space as a battlefield.

Why is Pekingology experiencing a revival today? Because Xi has returned to their "Way of the Ancients," by systematically dismantling the limited openness he perceives as systemic weaknesses since his first day in office. With the resurgence of Pekingology, Beijing is also adjusting its response. A set of strategies, which can be termed "Counter-Pekingology," has already taken shape.

Counter-Pekingology can be understood as a series of restrictive, guiding, and misleading measures taken by the CCP to maintain secrecy.

Restrictive measures include, but are not limited to: keeping meeting minutes private; not publishing important documents or delaying their release; conveying directives orally without leaving a trace; canceling or reducing press conferences; discontinuing the release of various data and reports. Through numerous relevant laws and party regulations, security has been generalized, and the definition of secrets expanded. Discipline inspection commissions have intensified penalties for leaks, and the Ministry of State Security (MSS) has expanded its public presence and operational intensity to suppress and deter potential leakers.

To guide external thinking, they launch their own versions of "media analysis." Internally, various semi-official accounts interpret textual changes to guide public understanding of policies. For the outside world, selective publication, excerpting, and translation have become standard practice, along with launching their interpretations in English and other languages through multiple channels. The aim is to help foreigners develop the "correct mindset" about China.

Dedicated departments closely monitor China-watching communities, with infiltration, co-option, and suppression being common tactics. Access to information has become a privilege. Restricting information access suppresses unwelcome research while guiding attention toward the research the Party prefers, as research bandwidth is limited. Furthermore, the power of funding influences perceptions within China research circles. Beijing's "ology" travels with money.

Allowing rumors to flood the information space is also an effective tactic. Using "well-informed sources" to release information and control its flow has been a common method for decades, evolving with media development. Claims from unverifiable sources are amplified through broader Chinese diaspora communities, diverting and dispersing observers' attention.

Returning to the metaphor of high-tech-enabled Pekingology as rare earth extraction: just like actual rare earths, the CCP's export control regime is highly effective.

Improving Our Analytical Edge Amidst the Information Fog

The Black Box in Beijing and Pekingology seem to be in an arms race, constantly evolving and reinforcing each other. How can we sharpen our skills to better navigate this environment? I believe we should deepen our mastery of the Chinese language, extensively study Chinese culture, history, and other relevant fields, consistently read and comprehend official discourse, and endeavor to analyze information from a higher vantage point or a more empathetic perspective.

Moreover, even if "Counter-Pekingology" genuinely interferes, the very acts of silence, concealment, and misdirection are inherently valuable from a Pekingology analytical perspective. If we observe carefully enough, these actions can authentically reflect how they perceive matters and what their priorities are, thereby significantly enhancing our understanding.

For instance, in April 2019, as the U.S.-China trade war intensified, Qiushi magazine published "Several Issues Concerning Upholding and Developing Socialism with Chinese Characteristics." This was *part* of a speech Xi gave in January 2013 at a study session for cadres on the spirit of the 18th Party Congress. This speech predated the leaked Document No. 9 from that year and was even more direct in its language. If we had known about this speech at the time, we would have clearly understood that Xi was an entirely different type of leader from his predecessors, but we did not.

If we reflect carefully, the timing of its republication and the length of the delay in its release, within that specific context, could provide incredibly valuable information.

Similarly, in January 2025, under the shadow of Trump's re-election and a potential trade war, Qiushi published the *main portion* of Xi's speech from a February 2023 study session for cadres on the spirit of the 20th Party Congress. What can we analyze from this?

Conclusion and Outlook

Establishing a reliable analytical framework, complemented by Pekingology, is the best way to navigate complex and often confusing information. Even amidst the current dense fog, there are many valuable clues to uncover.

Moving forward, I will utilize the analytical framework established in this article to conduct comprehensive analyses of open-source information and rumors.

The next piece will analyze how Xi is attempting to use purges as a means of self-revolution to reshape the PLA into a force absolutely obedient to him and militarily capable, with results we will soon witness.

The third piece will analyze how Xi's calculations regarding the Taiwan problem are changing, and why reckless moves by relative parties could hasten a looming Taiwan crisis.

Stay tuned.

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