Cracking the PLA Cipher: Self-Revolution Aims to Forge the Edge

Introduction

The previous article, "Beyond the Whispers: Analysis, Methodology and Pekingology," explored how to build a reliable framework for deciphering information about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This article will apply that framework to analyze the dramatic changes currently underway within the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Among the various recent shifts within the CCP, the purge of the PLA has been the most difficult to understand. The intensity, speed, and high-level ranks involved are rare in the CCP's history.

As the first in a series of articles on the PLA, this piece will start by examining the "self-revolution"—what is happening, why it is happening, and how it is being carried out. All analysis is based on publicly available information.

What Happened, How It's Known

Since Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2012, he has purged a large number of military officers through anti-corruption investigations. After securing his third term at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, a series of dramatic changes began to unfold within the PLA.

• July 2023: The commander and political commissar of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) were removed simultaneously. A large number of other Rocket Force officers were also purged or dismissed.

• August 31, 2023: CMC member and defense minister Li Shangfu was placed under investigation.

• September 21, 2023: His predecessor, Wei Fenghe, was also placed under investigation.

• October 2023: Li Shangfu was removed from his posts as State Councilor and Defense Minister. In December, Admiral Dong Jun, the former Navy Commander, was appointed as the new Defense Minister.

• April 2024: The PLA abolished the Strategic Support Force (SSF), splitting it into the Information Support Force, the Military Aerospace Force, and the Cyberspace Force.

• June 2024: Li and Wei were expelled from the Party.

• November 27, 2024: The Financial Times reported that, according to U.S. officials, China was investigating Defense Minister Dong Jun.

• November 28, 2024: At a press conference for the Ministry of National Defense, a spokesperson refuted the report and announced that CMC member and director of the Political Work Department (PWD), Miao Hua, was under "disciplinary review" for "serious violations."

• 2025: After attending the closing ceremony of the National People's Congress (NPC) on March 11, CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong has not been seen in public.

• March 14, 2025: Miao Hua was removed from his position as an NPC delegate due to "serious disciplinary and legal violations."

• June 2, 2025: Xinhua News Agency reported that Xu Qiliang, the former Vice Chairman of the CMC, had passed away.

• June 27, 2025: The Standing Committee of the NPC removed Miao Hua from his post as a member of the PRC Central Military Commission.

Through an examination of official announcements and other information, the outside world has learned that dozens of senior officers and cadres from various CMC departments, branches, theater commands, and military and aerospace enterprises have been purged or dismissed. In addition, observers have employed various old-school Pekingology methods, including carefully watching state television footage, monitoring attendance at meetings and events, and tracking changes to relevant information on official websites.

These methods have generally been effective, helping to piece together the basic outline and more details of the ongoing purge. However, they have their limitations. For example, judging whether an officer has been purged based on their prolonged absence from public view has led to some exceptions. Ju Qiansheng, the commander of the SSF, was absent from key events for an extended period, including the 2023 PLA Anniversary Reception, but he reappeared in 2024. He was seen alongside Xu Zhongbo, the former political commissar of the Rocket Force, who had been previously replaced and was widely believed to have been purged.

Why has the outside world been able to learn about this military turmoil? Given the CCP’s inherent opacity, if the Party wanted to conceal the situation, it could have completely hidden it from the outside world. The fact that these clues can now be uncovered suggests the Party is allowing information to become public, even if it is scarce and vague. Considering the military’s unique nature and the high ranks involved, the CCP often uses a mix of conventional and unconventional methods to convey information. The unconventional methods include subtle changes in documents and propaganda, and using affiliated media in Hong Kong and overseas to leak information. If external propaganda is "the party talks to itself," and internal media is "the party discusses issues internally," then this method is "the party whispers to itself." A prime example is the 2013 purge of retired Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) member Zhou Yongkang. Before the official announcement, the authorities spent nearly a year releasing subtle hints, like peeling an onion, while simultaneously cleaning up Zhou's network. All the while, the official stance was "Neither confirm nor deny. You know what I mean." This approach allowed the outside world to digest the shock of the event and mitigate negative impacts on the Party's image.

A careful observation reveals that the CCP's information strategy regarding the purge has been adjusted based on circumstances. The 2023 purge of the Rocket Force and the military-industrial complex sparked reasonable doubts about the PLA's readiness. A January 2024 Bloomberg report, citing U.S. intelligence, claimed that Chinese missiles were filled with water instead of fuel. Given the current state of the Rocket Force's equipment, the accuracy of this news is, at best, questionable. Following this, the CCP appeared to selectively disclose information to counter this narrative. For example:

• March 2023: Tan Ruisong, Chairman of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), was dismissed.

• August 2024: Tan was placed under investigation.

• December 2024: The PLA conducted a high-profile test flight of two new stealth aircraft.

• January 2025: The resumes of Hao Zhaoping, General Manager of AVIC, and Yang Wei, Deputy General Manager and Chief Designer of the J-20 stealth fighter jet, were removed from the group's official website. Yang Wei's last public appearance was in October 2024.

• February 2025: Tan was expelled from the Party and accused of "living off the military industry."

• Starting July 2025: Photos of new fighter jets and drones participating in a military parade, as well as a new stealth aircraft undergoing test flights, appeared online.

• August 2025: Tan was indicted on charges of embezzlement, bribery, and insider trading.

At the same time, rumors, misinformation, and disinformation have flooded the information space. It is worth noting that some rumors have shown a high degree of accuracy and timeliness. For instance, some sources reported the death of Xu Qiliang in late May, days before the official announcement. Therefore, even these low-confidence pieces of information are worth discussing.

For a long time, rumors and leaks have served as a tool for intra-Party struggle, frequently appearing during periods of political tension and heightened internal competition. They are used to undermine the image and agenda of specific individuals, though their actual impact on high-level power struggles has been mixed. The turmoil within the PLA, coupled with discontent toward Xi and the leadership among overseas dissidents and insiders with some knowledge of the system, has fueled these rumor mills. Different people with different backgrounds then interpret the same rumor in completely different or illogical ways, which are then amplified by various media matrices, further polluting the information environment.

This complexity can be both disadvantageous and advantageous for the Party. There are indications that some leaks and rumors are officially sanctioned. In some cases, a feed-and-expose tactic, a counterintelligence tradecraft, may be used to undermine the credibility of specific individuals and institutions. In this maze beneath the fog, the Party can easily capitalize on information vacuums and weaponize valuable information to achieve its goals.

The various information transmission patterns summarized above embody the logic of both Pekingology and Counter-Pekingology. Deception is a state of mind and the mind of the State. To understand what is happening, one must approach it from multiple levels and delve deeper into the significance of the message itself, its source, its context, and the way it is being delivered.

What It Is, What It Isn't

If the missing Vice Chairman He Weidong were to be officially purged, he would be:

• The first Politburo member purged since Sun Zhengcai in 2017.

• The eighth CMC member purged since Xi came to power in 2012.

• The first incumbent CMC Vice Chairman purged since Zhao Ziyang in 1989.

• The first incumbent uniformed CMC Vice Chairman to fall from grace since Lin Biao in 1971.

• The first incumbent uniformed CMC Vice Chairman to be officially purged since He Long in 1967.

Listing these cases provides a broader historical context, helping to analyze what the PLA is and what its relationship with the Party truly is.

The PLA is the armed wing of the CCP. Its primary missions also differ from those of other national militaries.

• The first and most important is to keep the regime in power at all costs, as was bloodily demonstrated in Beijing in 1989.

• Second, it is to defend the nation and execute the leadership's operational orders.

• Third, it is to participate in political movements, most fully exemplified during the Cultural Revolution, when it helped stabilize the situation and support the movement.

• It also undertakes other secondary functions.

Some candid Chinese textbooks also describe it this way, though for political correctness, they place the state before the Party’s role as its guardian.

Given the PLA's importance, the CCP has established the principle of "the Party commands the gun" as a core tenet. At the highest level, this is embodied by the Party's General Secretary also serving as Chairman of the CMC. Typically, two military officers serve as CMC Vice Chairmen and are also Politburo members, acting as military representatives. The CMC forms the bridge between the CCP and the PLA. Numerous institutional arrangements have also been established, including the creation of Party committees, political organs, and political commissars within the troops.

The above seems to lay out a fundamental understanding of the PLA that can be used for analysis. However, a closer look reveals that almost all of these understandings are flawed, at least in practice. It's not that easy for the Party to command the gun.

Mao Zedong once said, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," and his political ups and downs are the best illustration of this. Deng Xiaoping never held the Party's top post, yet he served as CMC Chairman from 1981 to 1989 and, during that time, purged two General Secretaries. Even after stepping down as CMC Chairman in 1992, he almost ousted the then-General Secretary and CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin with his Southern Tour speeches, simply because he still controlled the military. This looks more like "the gun commands the Party." Jiang, who narrowly survived, may have learned a lesson. When Hu Jintao took over as General Secretary in 2002, Jiang did not step down as CMC Chairman. This meant that from 2002 to 2004, the roles of General Secretary and CMC Chairman were not held by the same person. Even after he formally resigned as CMC Chairman, he maintained a strong influence by installing loyalists, which weakened Hu's control over the military as the Party leader.

The PLA has also been problematic in executing its main missions.

• During the 1989 crackdown, many officers—including the commander of the 38th Group Army who was imprisoned for refusing to carry out orders—opposed firing on demonstrators. After this, the PLA "outsourced" most of the suppression tasks to domestic security agencies and the People's Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary organization that was under the dual leadership of the military and the government at the time. This led to the rise of security czars like Zhou Yongkang, whose security budget once exceeded the military's.

• When it came to participating in political movements, the PLA was half-hearted. During the Cultural Revolution, it often feigned compliance while being asked to support the "Leftists," and conflicts frequently erupted between senior military generals and ultra-leftists.

• Even executing orders was questionable. The divergence between the PLA and the Party leadership can be traced back as early as the Korean War. During the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Jiang Zemin, who had not yet fully consolidated control over the military, faced pressure from senior generals with high status and revolutionary seniority to take action. This group included CMC Vice Chairman Liu Huaqing, who was also a PBSC member.

In the past, the PLA was good at doing what it wanted while remaining under the Party's control. While swearing allegiance to the Party leader, the PLA acted as an invisible kingmaker at critical moments. The military, while "providing escort for reform and opening up," was busy making money through business. The equipment department, while modernizing, was enriching itself. Political cadres, while representing the Party to supervise the military, were building personal patronage networks. The reason for this is that the PLA has been a highly self-contained, self-governing fiefdom. It accepts the Party's leadership but retains enough autonomy. Decades of development have turned the PLA into a combination of enhanced military capability, widespread corruption, and a lack of oversight. This has created a challenge for anyone attempting to command the world's largest military.

For Xi, who is well-versed in Mao's "On Contradiction," this is not an unsolvable paradox; he needs to constantly transform these contradictions. Since taking office, he has, on the one hand, leveraged the features of the Leninist Party to the greatest extent to control the military—where the supreme leader holds the key levers, uses rules, and exercises raw power. On the other hand, he has further institutionalized Party control over the military to make it "both red and expert," so it can better execute its most important mission. Understanding how Xi handles these issues from the perspective of his and the Party's worldview can help unravel the mysteries of the PLA today.

Purge is Good: Self-Revolution to Break the Cycle of History

Xi’s method rests on a Leninist conviction: The purge makes the Party stronger.

Borrowing ironically from the movie Wall Street, one could imagine Xi addressing his officers:

The point is, comrades, that Purge, for lack of a better way, is good. Purge is right. Purge works. Purge clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the revolutionary spirit. Purge, in all of its forms; purge for life, for money, for love, knowledge has marked the upward surge of mankind. And purge, you mark my words, will not only save the PLA, but that other malfunctioning corporation called the CCP.

The obsession with purges reaches back to Stalin, who eliminated swaths of Soviet cadres and nearly all senior commanders in the Red Army, elevating the purge into ideology and codifying it in his Short Course. Mao drew on this model in Yan’an, launching the Rectification Movement that systematically purged and indoctrinated cadres, soldiers, and intellectuals. Through denunciations, remolding, imprisonment, and executions, Mao secured his supremacy.

Communists may argue that purges ultimately strengthened combat power: Stalin purged, and in 1945 the Red Army planted its flag on the Reichstag; Mao purged, and in 1949 the PLA routed the Nationalists. Causality is debatable, but the victors prevailed. As Stalin is said to have told Mao: “The victors are not judged, nor can they be condemned. This is a universal axiom.”

Although the belief in the purge is the same, Xi is very different in character and methods. He is a cool-headed, rational, calculating risktaker. Unlike predecessors who reveled in bloodshed and chaos, Xi acts with more restraint and order. Early in his rule, he adopted a two-pronged strategy—purging officers while overhauling the PLA’s structure—to consolidate control swiftly. Alongside the stick, he used carrots, co-opting the sidelined and neutralizing collective resistance. The result: a PLA more professional, confident, and joint-operations capable.

The Party’s 2021 third historical resolution praised Xi’s military rectification:

At one stage, the problem of weakened Party leadership over the people’s army was acute. Left unresolved, it would undermine not only combat effectiveness but also the fundamental principle of Party command over the gun. The Party Center and the CMC advanced political training with rectification spirit, transforming the PLA’s political ecosystem.

Historical resolutions mark the full consolidation of each paramount leader. Among the ten “historical lessons” distilled in 2021, “Self-Revolution” was enshrined. The term is telling: “Self” excludes outside oversight, affirming the Party alone has the mandate to purify stagnation bred by lack of checks. “Revolution” means the Party must always remain a revolutionary party, through movement, mobilization, struggle, and unity. As CCP rhetoric puts it: “The great self-revolution leads the great social revolution.” In short, “Self-Revolution” means the Party needs to declare a forever war on itself, to prevent it from destroying itself in the end.

Xi elevated this concept further, calling “Self-Revolution” the second answer to break the cycle of history. In 1945, democrat Huang Yanpei asked Mao in a Yan’an cave how China could escape the law that dynasties “flourish rapidly and perish suddenly.” This was China’s Question to Heaven. Mao’s answer was democracy. Xi’s answer is Self-Revolution—an audacious vision that dwarfs his predecessors, even Mao. Mao only paid lip service, and when the Cultural Revolution unleashed “great democracy,” Xi himself witnessed its chaos. Now he offers Mao’s truer answer.

CCP leaders have long sought to ensure their dynastic communism endures. As John Garnaut argued in his 2017 speech Engineers of the Soul: The founding families of the PRC are steeped in the Dynastic System and its cycle of creation and destruction. To prevent the decay, Maoism’s answer is perpetual purge. This is the antidote to the calcification and putrefaction that have destroyed every previous dynasty and inevitably set in after the founding leaders leave the scene. This is why Xi and his peers believe that this approach is still highly relevant and existential.

By canonizing “Self-Revolution” as the second answer, Xi has elevated purge, rectification, and this red worldview into the Party’s highest ideology. If Self-Revolution truly breaks the cycle of history, it would be the CCP’s version of “the end of history.”

Ideological as it is, the framework has explanatory and predictive power. It shapes how the CCP thinks about purges and how it conducts them in the PLA: to ensure that the gun forever protects red rule.

The Roulette Turns Red: The Fall of Military Princelings

Xi’s family background has provided him with unique advantages. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a guerrilla leader and a political commissar in the PLA. His wife, Peng Liyuan, is a PLA Major General and a military singer. Most importantly, as a Princeling—a descendant of revolutionaries and founding fathers of the PRC—he holds a privileged status and a powerful network. His ties with fellow members of the red aristocracy, particularly within the PLA, have given him deeper insight into the military. The most well-known of these is Zhang Youxia, the current CMC Vice Chairman, whose father was a general who fought alongside Xi’s father. Others include Liu Yuan, son of former President Liu Shaoqi, who served as commissar of the General Logistics Department (GLD).

These Princelings see the Party and the PLA as a family affair. They share a common diagnosis of the political situation: the cause forged by their revolutionary fathers’ blood is in decline and requires bold action to save it. They helped Xi quickly purge a large number of corrupt or disloyal generals, and few of the Princelings themselves were investigated. Their privileged status gave them the option not to participate in the widespread purchase of ranks. Even if they engaged in corruption, they were likely protected—at least until the rules of the game changed.

Xi has purged countless people since taking office, but the most important purge for him may have started before he even became leader. It was the downfall of another Princeling, Bo Xilai, in 2012. Bo and Xi had similar prominent families, tough youth experiences, and a shared red worldview. Bo had launched a Maoist-style campaign in Chongqing to vie for the top leadership position. In 2012, his police chief, Wang Lijun, fled to the U.S. consulate, exposing Bo’s wife's murder and ultimately leading to Bo’s purge. As the heir apparent at the time, Xi likely played a role in that purge. Bo was sentenced to life in prison in 2013, which shocked and silenced various red families. They realized that if one of their own could be treated this way, no one was safe.

For Xi, the most likely threat to his rule would come from fellow Princelings who also possess a bloodline entitlement and a network of connections. Bo also had close ties to military Princelings such as Liu Yuan. Conversely, only Xi, as one of them, could truly weaken the influence of the red aristocracy. In the 2017-2018 leadership reshuffles of the Party Central Committee, NPC, and advisory body CPPCC, a large number of Princelings were removed from the lists. The red aristocracy was not only marginalized, but some were subsequently targeted directly.

Li Shangfu, the defense minister who was investigated in 2023, is the son of a senior officer in the PLA Railway Corps. The Equipment Development Department (EDD), where Li served as minister, publicly solicited tips on violations and discipline issues dating back to October 2017. This was both the start of Li’s tenure and the end of Zhang Youxia’s. The equipment department, which these two Princelings had led for a decade, was the area with the highest concentration of red aristocrats in the military. A large number of military princelings, represented by the sons of CMC Vice Chairmen Ye Jianying, Liu Huaqing, and Chi Haotian, control the military industry and equipment departments. The primary drivers of the investigation were likely equipment defects and corruption, but it also served to dismantle entrenched patronage networks. By directly "decapitating" an incumbent CMC member, a clear signal was sent to the whole system.

In 2024, the purge expanded to include theater commands and military services. You Haitao, the purged former deputy commander of the PLA Army (PLAA), is the son of a former commander of the Chengdu and Guangzhou military regions (MR). In the Nanjing MR, he had worked with several Princelings. After the military reforms, he went to the newly established PLAA headquarters, while his Princeling colleagues took command of the Eastern Theater Command's Army and the Beijing Garrison. The latter, Wang Chunning, later served as commander of the PAP and has since gone missing and been replaced. When a red descendant is investigated for corruption or disloyalty, it is seen as them betraying the cause their fathers fought for, or, to use a term recently adopted by the Party, "discarding their red gene."

Political cadres have also become targets, including Miao Hua, the director of the PWD. Miao has had a long-standing relationship with Xi in Fujian and was rapidly promoted after Xi came to power. But it is also worth noting how he was promoted before that. Miao is not a Princeling, but his father-in-law, Ye Hanlin, was the political commissar of the former 31st Group Army. This explains Miao’s rapid early promotions, culminating in his role as political director of the 31st Group Army. Ye passed away on October 24, 2024. On November 28, a spokesperson announced that Miao was under investigation.

Just as Bo Xilai's downfall occurred before the first round of military purges, the beginning of this round of purges may have started earlier than 2023. It likely began in 2021 with the purge of Liu Yazhou, the former political commissar of the National Defense University (NDU). Liu’s father was a senior officer in the Lanzhou MR, and his father-in-law was former President Li Xiannian. His prominent background facilitated his rapid promotion, but Liu became famous for his writing. He published a large number of military literature and strategic commentaries, and his bold and profound critical thinking was influential both inside and outside the Party and the military. In 2017, Liu retired but was not assigned a position in the NPC. In 2021, reports surfaced that Liu had gone missing. In 2023, Hong Kong media reported that Liu was involved in corruption and could be sentenced to life in prison. Liu did not belong to the patronage network of the first round of purged corrupt officers. In fact, he once brazenly claimed that among generals with MR-level rank, only he and Liu Yuan had not given money to former CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou.

His Princeling identity provided protection, allowing Liu to publish a great deal of controversial commentary without consequence. Now, it may be these very writings that have landed him in trouble. As a cadre who grew up during the reform era, Liu often reflected on history, criticized the system, and supported political system reform. These views could be categorized as historical nihilism and constitutional democracy, which the Party has demanded be resisted. As a political commissar representing the Party to supervise and control the military, he once advocated for the nationalization of the military, which directly contradicts the principle of the Party commanding the gun. As a rare senior officer who had lived in the U.S. and visited Taiwan, he had unique insights into their systems, military strength, and potential military actions against both the U.S. and Taiwan. These views are now considered anachronistic. As the commissar of the NDU, the highest military academy, his ideas were amplified, influencing many officers and gathering a group of like-minded individuals.

In short, his past remarks can be seen as a microcosm of the "ideological confusion" of the reform era. A soldier with his own thoughts in an authoritarian regime is extremely dangerous to the ruler. The Party has always demanded that PLA officers and soldiers "arm their minds" with Party ideology, especially Xi Jinping’s military thought. Ideas are like viruses. Once they take hold, they're difficult to root out. Following Liu’s purge, the PLA launched a comprehensive "investigation and cleanup of pernicious information involving Liu Yazhou" campaign, effectively unpersoning him and sending all of his work down the memory hole.

It can be said that Liu is both Patient Zero for "pernicious ideas" and Patient Zero for a new round of purges, because "cure the sickness to save the patient" has been the consistent policy of CCP purges since the Yan'an Rectification.

Due to the high opacity and personalization of Chinese elite politics, we cannot know for sure the specific reasons for these purges. However, by considering them in a broader historical context, we might be able to understand why Xi suddenly accelerated this new round of purges.

Déjà Vu: Accelerating Factors of the New Purge

Xi is often sarcastically called the "Chief Accelerator" by his critics. To a certain extent, this nickname does capture his characteristics. Unlike the past’s incremental, consensus-based collective leadership, he tends to push his agenda forward decisively and quickly, imbuing his goals with a sense of urgency and crisis to make the entire Party machinery accelerate. Therefore, we can reverse-engineer what events might have created this sense of urgency for him and the leadership. A number of data points, which can be called "Déjà Vu Moments," likely served as key accelerators.

In February 2022, the Russian military launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the initial offensive proved to be a disaster. This brought back memories of another disastrous invasion 43 years earlier, in February 1979. In that year, the PLA amassed over 200,000 troops to invade Vietnam but suffered heavy casualties against a battle-hardened Vietnamese army. Both invasions exposed the same issues: political priorities over military readiness, inadequate preparation, and a hollowed-out military.

Xi observed the impact of that War up close. In 1979, his first job was serving as secretary to Geng Biao, who became Secretary-General of the CMC in January, overseeing its daily operations. Geng participated in both pre-war preparations and wartime decisions and later planned to streamline the bloated PLA. This valuable experience helped Xi understand how the CMC operates and how to reform it. If 1979 was the starting point for the leadership’s reassessment of the PLA, then 2022 may be Ground Zero for Xi’s own reassessment of the PLA. Has the "peace sickness" that has plagued the PLA for over 40 years truly been cured? Can the PLA truly "fight and win wars" after the 2015 military reforms?

In August 2022, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. In response, the PLA conducted large-scale live-fire exercises around the island. More than 100 warplanes and a dozen warships rehearsed a blockade and joint fire strikes, and the Rocket Force launched multiple DF-15B ballistic missiles that flew over Taiwan. It was the tensest moment in the Taiwan Strait since 1996.

In 1996, before Taiwan's first direct presidential election, the PLA launched multiple DF-15 missiles into the waters north and south of Taiwan and amassed over 100,000 troops in Fujian province for joint sea, land, and air exercises. In response, the U.S. deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups to the waters east of Taiwan. Under U.S. deterrence, China backed down. At the time, Xi served as the Party Secretary of Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian, located just tens of kilometers from Taiwan's offshore islands. He was also the first party secretary of the Fuzhou Military Subdistrict, though he wasn’t directly involved in military operations. This gave him a front-row seat to a high-stakes military standoff.

The 1996 crisis was a turning point for both U.S.-China relations and the PLA’s development. The two countries eventually moved toward a partnership, and the PLA learned again that weakness invites aggression. Following this, the defense budget was significantly increased. Compared to the 1996 turning point, the 2022 event mostly reinforced existing beliefs: that the U.S. is the biggest threat to China's great rejuvenation, including the unification of Taiwan, and that military means are the most powerful way for China to shape the situation in the Taiwan Strait. This was all codified in the 20th Party Congress report in October, which included removing assessments of "peace and development" and "strategic opportunities," while repeatedly emphasizing "risks and challenges" and even "stormy seas," as well as security and struggle.

The former Eastern Theater Command (ETC) commander, He Weidong, reportedly planned these military exercises, and he became the biggest dark horse. He, who had never served on the CMC and wasn't even a delegate to the Party Congress, was directly promoted to Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman. This unprecedented promotion fully demonstrated Xi’s firm grip over the Politburo and the PLA and showed that He had earned Xi's trust.

In June 2023, with his relationship with the Russian military leadership deteriorating, Wagner mercenary group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin launched a mutiny. His forces occupied the headquarters of the Southern Military District in Rostov and marched toward Moscow. For Russians, this was their "Déjà Vu Moment." In August 1991, hardliners in the Soviet Communist Party put General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev under house arrest, attempting to save the Party and the Soviet Union from his reforms. Tanks rolled into the center of Moscow, but the army refused to fire on the people. The coup collapsed in less than three days. In December, the Soviet Union dissolved.

In December 2012, Xi commented on the failed coup as follows:

Why do we unswervingly adhere to the Party's absolute leadership over the army? It's a lesson learned from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military was depoliticized, de-partified, and nationalized, which disarmed the Party. A few people who wanted to save the Soviet Union arrested Gorbachev, but they were defeated after only a few days because the instrument of dictatorship was not in their hands.

Finally, with a single word from Gorbachev, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was dissolved. In the end, nobody was man enough to stand up and fight.

Xi is determined not to let the same thing happen in China, and the situation when he came to power was not optimistic. The Party’s control over the PLA was loose, and senior officers were selling ranks to build private armies loyal to themselves. Prigozhin’s private army met with almost no effective resistance from the regular military along its route. Some Russian generals took a wait-and-see approach, acquiesced, or may have even colluded with him, making it seem for a moment that Putin’s iron-fisted rule was on the verge of collapse.

The armed convoy racing toward Moscow on the highway also brings to mind other armed incidents that have occurred in China’s capital. In March 2012, Ling Jihua, the director of the CCP General Office (CGO), used the force of the Central Guard Bureau (CGB), responsible for the security of leaders, to cover up his son's car crash. In 1976, Hua Guofeng, in a joint effort with PLA generals and Wang Dongxing, the director of both the CGO and CGB, arrested the Gang of Four and ended the Cultural Revolution.

This once again reminded Xi that ensuring the PLA’s absolute loyalty to the Party—and especially to him personally—is of extreme and literally life-or-death importance.

In August 2023, in a mysterious plane crash reminiscent of the Lin Biao incident, Prigozhin paid the ultimate price for his misbehavior. In the same month, the outside world began to observe the first blood of the new round of purges in the PLA.

These historical mirror images, intertwined with contemporary events, likely deepened the leadership's anxieties. In their view of an even darker world, the PLA’s capability and reliability have become even more critical, but neither can be taken for granted. This necessitates a more thorough examination of the PLA. However, the real trigger for the new round of purges was likely the balloon that floated toward Alaska in January 2023.

Wandering Balloon in the Shattered Skies

• On January 28, 2023, a high-altitude balloon from China entered U.S. airspace over Alaska. Days later, it reentered the U.S. and was spotted by civilians.

• On February 1, Secretary of State Antony Blinken pressed Beijing to take action; Chinese diplomats appeared caught off guard.

• On February 2, the Pentagon publicly identified a High-Altitude Surveillance Balloon hovering over Montana.

• On February 3, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) called it a civilian airship used for meteorological research that had strayed off course, expressing regret. Blinken canceled his planned visit to Beijing.

• On February 4, a U.S. Air Force F-22 shot it down with an AIM-9X missile, and the Navy recovered parts of the wreckage.

• On February 9, State Department officials said: The balloon was capable of conducting signals intelligence collection operations and was part of a fleet that had flown over more than 40 countries across five continents, with a manufacturer tied to the PLA.

• The same day, in a briefing to lawmakers, officials expressed the belief that both the senior leadership of the PLA and CCP, including Xi, were also unaware of the balloon mission over the U.S., and that China is still trying to figure out how this happened.

The episode derailed efforts to stabilize U.S.–China relations and exposed the PLA as highly stovepiped and poorly supervised. Such isolation and poor coordination have caused similar incidents before. In January 2011, Defense Secretary Robert Gates met Hu Jintao in Beijing ahead of Hu’s state visit to Washington. Hours before, the PLA conducted its first test flight of the J-20 stealth fighter. Hu, as CMC chair, seemed unaware when asked. Xi, who had just met Gates the previous day, was likely equally surprised. The timing fueled speculation that PLA insiders sought to sabotage the summit. Hu’s weak grip allowed the military to carve out autonomy through its monopoly on expertise. Just three months earlier, Xi had been elevated to CMC vice chairman—his final step toward being anointed successor. The episode showed him firsthand the dangers of a daredevil PLA acting on its own.

Much has been written about Xi’s Cultural Revolution trauma, but 2007–2012 was an equally important formative experience. As Hu’s deputy, Xi directly witnessed corruption, infighting, and centrifugal bureaucracy threatening the Party—and the necessity of harsh rectification. Twelve years later, the balloon incident showed that despite massive purges and restructuring, those problems persist with serious consequences. Xi still had much work to do, beginning with punishing those involved.

Reports point to the Strategic Support Force (SSF), which managed the balloon program. Units may have failed to report problems upward, leaving senior leaders blindsided. Operators may have been overconfident, assuming the balloon could evade detection—or that detection wouldn’t matter. Once ordered to resolve the issue, they still failed. At least two balloons strayed off course in the Western Hemisphere at the same time; operators failed to use onboard maneuvering systems to keep them from violating foreign airspace or to exit quickly.

Created in late 2015, the SSF was a flagship reform. Its Aerospace Systems Department inherited space bases of the General Armaments Department (GAD) and support units of the Second Department of the General Staff Department (2PLA), including the Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau and the Beijing Institute of Applied Meteorology. Its first commander was the former Chief of Staff of the Second Artillery Corps (SAC); its first deputy commander and chief of staff was Li Shangfu.

The balloon program’s key figure was Wu Zhe, a professor at Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics and a former GAD science committee member specializing in stealth technology. Four private firms linked to him were sanctioned by the U.S. over the balloon program; they had received funding from the Central Military-Civil Fusion Development Commission (CMCFDC), chaired personally by Xi.

All of these institutions and their successors—SSF, PLARF, EDD, Joint Staff Department (JSD), the CMCFDC office—have seen leadership purges. Alongside the PLAA, all three new headquarters created on the last day of 2015 have been rocked.

The MFA’s ignorance of the balloon mirrored earlier episodes. The issue wasn’t whether MFA was in the loop, but that its misalignment was exposed, and it failed to manage perceptions. The parallel was the 2007 anti-satellite missile test (ASAT test), when SAC destroyed a weather satellite, creating thousands of debris pieces. MFA waited 12 days to confirm the test, then claimed it posed no threat.

The similarities are striking—and personal. Defense Minister Wei Fenghe had been SAC chief of staff during the ASAT Test, while incoming Defense Minister Li Shangfu then commanded the Xichang launch center. Both were almost certainly involved. MFA spokesman Liu Jianchao, who dodged questions from foreign journalists, became head of the International Liaison Department (ILD) in 2022; his spokesman colleague Qin Gang became foreign minister. Sixteen years later, the same generals and diplomats entered the leadership, and the same dysfunction reemerged.

Compared to 2007’s silence, in 2023 the MFA at least admitted within 48 hours that it was a civilian balloon off course, even saying it “regretted” the incident—echoing the 2001 EP-3 crisis, when Ambassador Joseph Prueher’s “Letter of the two sorries” defused tensions.

Admiral Prueher's connection to China is deeply tied to crises. In the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, as the commander of PACOM, he dispatched the USS Independence Carrier Battle Group to Taiwan. In 1999, before he was nominated as ambassador, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade occurred. He later recalled what President Jiang Zemin told him at Pearl Harbor during his first U.S. visit in 1997: "Before you can have trust, you must have mutual understanding, and before you have understanding, you've gotta have communication." All of these qualities are now critically scarce in both capitals.

It's fair to say that both sides handled the crisis poorly. After the balloon was shot down, Secretary Austin requested a call with Wei Fenghe, which was refused. Beijing might see post-shootdown contact as provocative. The U.S. misunderstood the CCP system: without top-level approval, the PLA has no authority to communicate, and hotlines have never been a preferred option for the Chinese. Wei, no longer a CMC member, had no real power as defense minister.

After the shootdown, MFA floundered, repeating that it was an innocent civilian balloon, accusing Washington of sensationalizing, and saying that China needed to clarify the fact to the international community. The balloon debris recovered by the U.S. did not seem to bolster China's "fact." Xi clearly has a low opinion of the MFA's work and decided to play hardball.

In February, Biden obliquely referenced the balloon in the State of the Union:

As we made clear last week, if China threatens our sovereignty, we will act to protect our country. And we did.

...But in the past two years, democracies have become stronger, not weaker. Autocracy has grown weaker, not stronger.

Name me a world leader who would change places with Xi Jinping. Name me one. Name me one.

Xi responded directly:

Our external environment has changed dramatically, with rising uncertainties and unpredictable factors. Especially the all-round containment, encirclement, and suppression by Western countries led by the United States has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our development.

This is a clear signal to the entire system: You are clear to engage.

• In February, U.S. officials alleged China was considering providing lethal aid to Russia, prompting a confrontation between Wang Yi and Blinken in Munich.

• In March, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) led the raids on US consulting and due diligence firms.

• In April, Xi told EU Commission President von der Leyen that Taiwan was China’s core of the core interests and accused Washington of trying to “trick China into invading Taiwan, but that he would not take the bait.” Days later, the PLA staged the “Joint Sword” drills encircling Taiwan.

Meanwhile, the PLA also sharply increased risky intercepts of U.S. aircraft and ships. This behavior seems puzzling because another EP-3 crisis could occur at the slightest mistake, but this uncertainty may be exactly what they want.

Xi’s message was simple: the gun remains firmly in his hands. During this period, diplomatic channels froze; the MFA was relegated to defending Beijing after events hit the news. For Xi, good cop or bad cop, as long as he can make the eagle talk, he is a good cop. And it did pay off.

In May, Sullivan met Wang Yi in Vienna, stressing the U.S. was not seeking conflict over Taiwan and was ready to “look forward.” Soon after, CIA Director Burns secretly visited Beijing to meet MSS Minister Chen Yixin, assuring the Chinese that the spy balloon incident had “blown over.” In June, Blinken finally visited Beijing and met Xi, agreeing to halt the free fall in ties.

But the very next day, Biden at a fundraiser again called Xi a dictator who had been embarrassed by the balloon, and mentioned Xi’s upset over the Quad. In Beijing’s view, this was exactly the all-round containment, encirclement, and suppression Xi had decried, reinforcing the leadership’s conviction that the U.S. is a lost cause and that the struggle will only intensify.

The last superpower China wrote off as a lost cause was the Soviet Union. By the early 1960s, ideological disputes had curdled into full rupture. When China struggled to recover from the devastation of the Great Leap Forward, it sought to ease relations with the Soviet Union. But in the spring of 1962, over 60,000 Xinjiang residents fled across the border into the Soviet Union under the lead of two PLA generals. Beijing labeled it a counterrevolutionary incident, and two Soviet consulates, deemed "black hands," were closed.

At the autumn plenum, the policy of détente, along with the ILD minister who proposed it, Wang Jiaxiang, was criticized and stripped of his power.

At the same plenum, Xi's father was purged. Coincidentally or not, the elder Xi had led the northwestern region, including Xinjiang, managed ethnic minority relations, and was accused of being a Soviet spy.

History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes. Whether 2011, 2007, or 1962, the balloon crisis was a full-circle moment. And Xi has vowed to break the cycle of history. His answer is Self-Revolution.

Poison: How to Project Manage the Purge

Xi doesn't use the term "anti-corruption campaign," probably because the campaign will eventually end. He has always used "anti-corruption struggle," and it is "always on the road." The term "struggle" implies the continuous definition, isolation, and elimination of enemies. This requires both a long-term vision and short-term goals—in a sense, it requires project management for a never-ending endeavor. The frequent phrases used during the purges of the past decade reveal this methodology.

On July 21, 2025, the CMC issued a new regulation demanding the "thorough elimination of pernicious influence (流毒) and the restoration of the image and credibility of political cadres." This directly links to the purged head of the PWD, Miao Hua, and recalls the purges of former CMC Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong ten years ago, the previous group of high-ranking officers labeled as "poison."

The official translation of “流毒” is "pernicious influence," which can be literally translated as "pervasive poison." Other frequently used terms include "lingering poison" (余毒) and "legacy poison" (遗毒). Together, these three terms form the official "detox" narrative, suggesting that the purged cadres have a widespread, deep, and lasting negative impact. This systematic harm, which has not been completely eradicated, connects the past, present, and future and requires long-term purges and rectifications to achieve a comprehensive purification of ideology, work style, and organization. This includes eliminating their political legacies and influence and purging officials connected to them or those whose loyalty is questionable.

If we were to find a starting point for this relentless detox, we would have to go back to the purge of Bo Xilai.

After Bo’s downfall in 2012, and a brief period of stabilization under Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang, Sun Zhengcai took over as Chongqing Party Secretary after the 18th Party Congress. Sun became the youngest Politburo member of the reform era and was seen as a strong contender for a future top leadership position. However, in February 2017, a central inspection team criticized the Chongqing Party Committee for "weakened Party leadership and an incomplete cleanup of the legacy poison of Bo and Wang." Shortly after, Chongqing Police Chief He Ting was investigated. In July, Sun was investigated. Chen Min'er, who had worked closely with Xi in Zhejiang, was appointed to replace Sun and entered the Politburo at the 19th Party Congress. After taking office, Chen prioritized cleaning up Sun's pernicious influence and the pervasive poison of Bo and Wang.

After Zhou Yongkang’s downfall in 2014, a number of officials associated with the security apparatus he once led were purged, including the former Secretary-General of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC), the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and the MSS Vice Minister in charge of counterintelligence. But the real drama unfolded during Xi’s second term:

• October 2018: Meng Hongwei, MPS Vice Minister and President of Interpol, was investigated.

• April 2020: MPS Vice Minister Sun Lijun was investigated.

• June 2020: Deng Huilin, Chongqing’s Police Chief, was investigated, becoming the third consecutive Chongqing police head to be purged. Following this, the target of the Chongqing cleansing became the "pervasive poison of Sun, Bo-Wang, and Deng."

• July 2020: An education and rectification campaign was launched within security services. The campaign's head, Chen Yixin, Secretary-General of the CPLAC, called it "scraping the bone to treat the poison, a self-revolution, and a Yan'an Rectification." Subsequently, a large number of security officials nationwide were purged.

• February 2021: A central inspection team criticized the MPS for not being thorough enough in eliminating the "lingering poison of Zhou, Meng, and Sun."

• April 2021: Chen convened a meeting, demanding the elimination of "two-faced people" who were disloyal to the party.

• September 2021: Sun was expelled from the Party and found to have "formed a cabal within the Party." Days later, former MPS Vice Minister and Minister of Justice Fu Zhenghua was investigated.

• January 2022: Wang Xiaohong, Party Secretary of the MPS, chaired a meeting to "thoroughly eliminate the pernicious influence of the Sun Lijun political clique." That year, members of the group were sentenced, and both Sun and Fu received suspended death sentences.

This carefully planned operation to fully control the security apparatus before the 20th Party Congress successfully concluded with Wang serving as Minister of the MPS and Chen as Minister of the MSS, with a large number of Xi’s loyalists taking key positions.

This methodical, systematic purge fully utilizes "the art of poison." For example, designating Sun Lijun as the head of the clique, listing him before more senior officials, suggests that the ultimate target might be Sun’s former boss, Jiang Zemin’s confidant, and former CPLAC head Meng Jianzhu. Similarly, listing Sun Zhengcai first in the list of Chongqing’s "poison," instead of in chronological order, may serve as a warning to other retired elders and a complete negation of any succession arrangements.

Although the purges are effective, the detox seems to have no end. In 2023, the MPS was still emphasizing the elimination of the poison of the Sun clique. Yuan Jiajun, the fourth Chongqing Party Secretary since Bo and an aerospace expert, still stated that the city must continue to clean up the poison of Sun, Bo-Wang, and Deng. If needed, the purge will continue and new names will be added to the list.

The same drama is playing out in the military. In 2014, CMC Vice Chairman Xu fell from grace. In October, Xi convened a "All-Army Political Work Conference" in Gutian, Fujian. In 1929, Mao clearly stated that the military must accept the Party’s political leadership. In 2014, Xi's stated task was to "implement the spirit of rectification and resolve major issues in building the military politically." At the meeting, Xi demanded the PLA to eliminate Xu’s pernicious influence and criticized problems among senior officers, warning that if left unaddressed, the military might no longer be red.

In 2015, the PLA established a "Leading Group for Implementing the Spirit of the Gutian Conference." Zhang Yang, the group leader and director of the General Political Department (GPD), stated that they must thoroughly eliminate the pervasive poison of Xu. When another CMC Vice Chairman Guo was expelled from the Party, Zhang later said the goal was to eliminate the pervasive poison of Guo and Xu. In 2017, Zhang himself became part of that "poison" when he and Fang Fenghui, the chief of the JSD, were purged before the 19th Party Congress. Zhang hanged himself during the investigation, becoming the first three-star general to commit suicide in PRC history.

These cases illustrate a typical pattern: a senior cadre is purged, labeled a "poison," and becomes a weapon to attack and threaten others. The Party holds a meeting within the system, launches a "detox" operation, purges more cadres, and labels some of them as "poison," starting a new cycle. As for who is the "poison," who is the "lingering," and who is the "legacy," everyone feels uncertainty until there is a knock on the door. Once the operation begins, it essentially continues until the boss believes he has complete control over the system—a highly subjective judgment for someone obsessed with control.

This new round of military purges shows the same pattern. Starting in 2023, Xi carried out a series of carefully planned moves:

• June: The CMC promoted the "regularization and institutionalization of political rectification."

• July 20: For the first time in five years, the PLA held a "All-Army Party Building Conference." Xi instructed them to "summarize the Party-building experiences of the military, especially the Gutian Conference."

• July 25: The Politburo’s collective study session focused on "comprehensively strengthening military governance." Xi emphasized "adhering to the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and strengthening the management and supervision of military spending."

• July 26: Xi inspects the Western Theater Command Air Force, emphasizing the need to "continuously deepen the rectification and anti-corruption efforts."

• July 31: Xi attended the ceremony to promote the new Rocket Force commander and political commissar.

• August 1: On the anniversary of the PLA's founding, the CMC released the "Opinions on Comprehensively Strengthening the Party's Building of the Military to Achieve the Centenary Goal of the PLA."

With the reshuffle of the Rocket Force leadership, the largest military purge in PRC history began.

In 2024, the rectification entered a new phase with a similar pattern. Ten years after the Gutian Conference, on June 19, Xi convened a "CMC Political Work Conference" in Yan’an, demanding "the promotion of a thorough spirit of self-revolution and the continued deepening of political rectification."

This was the second time in two years that Xi took the leadership to Yan’an, the starting point of Mao’s rectification and the place where Xi worked for seven years. In 2022, Xi led all PBSC members to visit the site of the 7th Party Congress, where Mao established his absolute leadership, and the cave where Mao lived and gave the first answer to how to break the cycle of history. The contemporary significance is clear: Xi has established his absolute leadership, and the Party must implement his new answer to break the historical cycle—self-revolution.

In 2024, Xi took military officers to visit the headquarters of the CMC from 1937 to 1947. During this period, the CCP established the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, the predecessor of the NDU. Mao personally rectified it and established its principles, the first of which was "a firm and correct political direction."

This series of purges and carefully orchestrated political stages shows that Xi is no longer satisfied with the military's obedience to the point of "You say jump, we say how high." Instead, he is demanding, "How about I say jump and you just jump?"

At the conference, Xi instructed senior officers to ensure that "the barrel of the gun is always in the hands of people loyal to the Party." The meeting was named the "CMC" conference rather than "All-Army", and officers were asked to "look at themselves and seriously rectify." A week later, two CMC members, Li and Wei, were expelled from the Party. All of this suggests that what will follow is a battle royale of high command.

Forging in the Crucible

Similar to political movements throughout the CCP's history, this battle royale began with articles.

• July 1: On the 103rd anniversary of the CCP, China National Defense Newspaper published an article titled "Continuously Deepening Political Rectification with a Thorough Spirit of Self-Revolution," which mentioned the need to "focus on resolving issues such as forging strong political loyalty."

• July 8: An article in the PLA Daily stated that "forging strong political loyalty" is a required responsibility for building the military politically.

• September: The PWD launched an educational campaign, "Steel-Hearted for the Party to Forge Loyalty," demanding a strong commitment to the Party.

• November: The director of the PWD Miao Hua was investigated.

• February 2025: The PWD launched a new educational campaign, "Forging Strong Political Loyalty, Fighting a Decisive Battle." The term "forging strong political loyalty" appeared frequently in propaganda.

• August 1: On the 98th anniversary of the PLA, the PLA Daily published an editorial, "Forge Strong Political Loyalty in a Revolutionary Tempering and Go All Out to Win the Decisive Battle to Achieve the Centenary Goal of the PLA."

One doesn't need to read through hundreds of newspapers to find this thread, because the authorities use a highly recognizable term: "铸牢" (forge strong.) This word is not commonly used in everyday language; its homophone, "筑牢" (build strong), appears more often.

"Build strong" is usually paired with concrete things, like a defensive line, while "forge strong" is used for abstract concepts, such as beliefs. To prevent misuse, the official Language and Writing Newspaper published an article on April 9 to explain the difference. According to the official definition, "forge strong" emphasizes something more internal and profound, describing a deep construction from "having something" to "internalizing it."

The word first appeared in the Party's political lexicon in a January 1990 People's Daily article. It documented military training for university graduates at the General Staff Department, stating the goal was to make them "forge a strong ideological foundation for dedicating themselves to national defense." In 1989, the Party used the military to suppress student-led demonstrations in Beijing. Since then, all university students have been required to undergo military training to instill political thought. While the intensity has changed, the core spirit remains the same: endure hardship, obey discipline, and transform oneself. This practice can be traced back to the Yan'an Rectification of the 1940s, and even to the CCP's origins, the Soviet Union.

Soviet and Russian red literature, most famously How the Steel Was Tempered, profoundly influenced the language and mindset of revolutionaries, their descendants, and generations of Chinese people till today. During the rectification, Mao demanded that everyone be "tempered" by revolutionary hardship. Today, this metallurgical term, 锻炼, has become one of the most common words for physical exercise in the Chinese language. Just like printing, one of China's four great inventions, whoever rules the word, rules the world.

Therefore, Xi’s repeated emphasis on the word "forge strong" shows how deeply he is immersed in the revolutionary lexicon, how seriously he takes the rectification of the Party, the state, and the military, and how relentless he is in this endeavor.

At the Politburo meeting in August 2025, Xi emphasized "using Xi Thought to unify hearts and forge souls" and "forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation." The former signals a renewed Party rectification, while the latter points to another large-scale purge, the targets of which were listed more than a decade ago: the eradication of "pervasive poison" related to ethnic separatism and religious extremism.

He began this forging of the PLA as soon as he came to power.

• In early 2013, the PLA launched an educational campaign, "Forge a Strong Military Soul."

• At the Two Sessions in March, in his first meeting with the PLA delegation as CMC Chairman, he stressed the need to "forge a strong military soul that listens to the Party's command."

• A series of purges, rectifications, and propaganda campaigns culminated in the 2014 Gutian Conference.

• Afterward, the PLA Daily published speeches from some representatives, many of whom were officers whose fates would later diverge. Among them was the newly appointed political commissar of the Lanzhou MR, Miao Hua, who said they must "replenish their spiritual calcium and forge a soul of loyalty."

• A month later, Miao was appointed commissar of the Navy, and three years later, he replaced the disgraced Zhang Yang as director of the PWD.

• For the next seven years, he was in charge of the military’s political work until his own downfall, when he became a new "poison," an impurity that had to be removed through forging.

These acts of forging are not isolated; they are tightly interconnected. The CMC's July notice on eliminating pernicious influences used the idiom "徙木立信", which translates to "moving a log to build trust." Originating over 2,000 years ago, it describes a reformist in Qin who rewarded a man for moving a log, thereby proving he was a man of his word. This idiom was also used to describe the "Eight Points" of 2012, which cadres were required to study again in 2025.

Xi demands that cadres and commissars manage themselves and keep their word. And after more than a decade in power, Xi has proven he is a man of his word, so his words must be taken very seriously. At the Politburo's collective study session in June, he once again mentioned this idiom, reiterated the importance of forging loyalty to the Party, and brought up breaking the historical cycle with his answer: "the string of self-revolution must be pulled even tighter." This phrasing is eerily similar to Mao’s language in 1962 when he emphasized class struggle.

The official readout of this study session did not mention the military, but CCTV footage showed that Xi's prepared remarks included Li Shangfu’s corruption crimes, leaving one to wonder what else he said beyond the official readout. Given that the 4th Plenum is scheduled for October, another tantalizing phrase is coming: the last sentence of the September Politburo meeting readout, "the meeting also studied other matters."

In many ways, Xi is both the forger and the wielder. He is determined to reforge the Party, the state, the gun, and the knife, to expel corrupt poison and forge pure steel. He is a dual wielder, with one sword being the purge and the other ideology. The newly forged edge must be directed both outward and inward. He swings them to slay enemies, to cut through constraints, and to break the cycle of history. He forges swords for himself and for everyone, to see them point it at external foes, at their own kin, or stab someone in the back. After the dust settles from iron and blood, the new forging will continue.

Epilogue

The Party is aimming to break the historical cycle through the loop of self-revolution. It is like a Mobius strip, a single-surfaced, endless loop, or, in communist terminology, a "spiral upward." The purge and the forge, to break and to build, are two sides of the strip, tightly intertwined. What's past is prologue, just as Xi said in his speech at Westminster Palace.

The purge of the PLA is not a Sisyphean game of whack-a-mole but rather the Party’s application of the dialectical materialism it believes in. Success is never guaranteed, and failure is not inevitable. Any assessment of the PLA’s capabilities, the CCP’s intentions, and the extent of Xi’s confidence in the PLA must be made with extreme caution.

Future installments in this series will delve into the personnel network and logic behind this round of purges.

Stay tuned.