FYI: As I have noted previously, there are parallels between this process and what in the early 1950s Isaiah Berlin described as an “artificial dialectic”:
That's a very good overview using good sources. Here are a few thoughts with more details:
As you mentioned, in 1979, Xi Jinping's first job was serving as secretary to Geng Biao. During that time, he was involved in editing and publishing the after-action reports of the 1979 war against Vietnam. This would give him insight into what went wrong and the scale of PLA losses during a four-week war. While doing interviews with PLA veterans from the '79 war, I noticed how not one of them ever talked about "liberating Taiwan". They have good reasons to know better than internet warriors.
In June 2001, General Liu Yazhou published in Beijing an internal book with 105 pages and the title 对台作战: 战略评估. Without explicitly stating it, he doesn't want to invade Taiwan. He distributed it to many interested people. It didn't make him popular with Xi. He also published books in Hong Kong that were not published inside China, which is unique for a PLA general. For a long time, he thought he could get away with such lone wolf behavior. He was wrong.
Thanks for the additional details. Your point about the PLA veterans makes me wonder if there’s a gap between rank-and-file veterans and the combat heroes who later rose to the top — like CMC Vice Chair Zhang Youxia, JSD Chief Liu Zhenli, and former Chief Li Zuocheng — and whether they share that same caution about war and Taiwan, or if their perspective shifted once they were the ones calling the shots.
In the case of Zhang Youxia, I think he is very much aware of how weak the PLA is. During the ’79 war, he commanded a company in the battle for Lao Cai (8th Company, 119th Regiment, 40th Inf Division, 14th Army). In 1984, during the Laoshan battle, he had risen to colonel and was at the center of that attack. He has seen a lot of fighting for months and from close. I don’t see such people stumbling into a war that is not limited, cannot be controlled, and where the PLA will be unable to react to counterstrikes on Chinese territory. Same as Liu Yazhou, he was born in 1950. It looks to me like Xi keeps him at age 75 and older in such a high position because anyone else has not even half his experience in actual warfare.
My sense is that Zhang and his cohort know how weak the PLA was, and their focus has been on addressing those specific shortcomings within a more modernized force.
On Taiwan, one school of thought holds that this cohort tends to prioritize real combat training over gray-zone activities. That’s also one analytical angle people have used to interpret He Weidong’s ouster.
This is a super sharp piece—it’s got the phrase “continuous revolution” in my head again, although there’s probably a reason Xi doesn’t use that term himself.
Thank you. Yes, the list is still getting shorter. Bloomberg did a great interactive piece noting that at least 14 generals promoted under Xi since 2012 have vanished or come under investigation. After the parade, it should be 15—the Central Theater commander, who was supposed to lead it, is also missing.
Problem (and a glaring/howling one at that) is, what kind of an edge will it be?
Apparently, there is no puzzle, riddle, suspense, or mystery here.
Mao and Xi have already shown / demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that their brand of self-revolution can be no more or no less than double-edged, which more often than not achieves the great effect of "killing a thousand enemies at the cost of mowing down eight hundred or many more of your own((杀敌一千自伤八百或多得多)."
The always “great, glorious and correct” Party has previously made an official conclusion that Mao’s self-revolution (culminating in the Great Cultural Revolution) was a catastrophe. And there is no denying that in China today literally millions of the Chinese have arrived at exactly the same conclusion about Xi’s revolution.
Pixy: This is a powerful second installment in your series, though I felt that you didn’t really explain “self-revolution” itself, its origins, significance and impact at any particular length. My understanding is that, like the now well-known “Cave Dialogue” between Mao and Huang Yanpei in July 1945, “self-revolution” also has its origins in the Yan’an period, in particular at the beginning of the Rectification which was encapsulated at the time in Hu Qiaomu’s call to ‘Drop Your Pants, Cut Off Your Tail, Get in Line to Wash in Public” 脫褲子，割尾巴， 排隊洗澡… There is much to be said about this, as well as about the long history of creating/ moulding New Socialist People/Men (Stalin and Mao), Revolution in the Depths of the Soul (Lin Biao), confessional culture and control; but all of that is far beyond the scope of this short note. You might find the following to be of interest: https://chinaheritage.net/journal/drop-your-pants-the-party-wants-to-patriotise-you-all-over-again-part-i/
You’re absolutely right. Thank you for sharing that excellent article link in your comment.
What you point out is indeed crucial for understanding self-revolution, but this piece is already quite long, so I had to make editorial choices. That’s why I condensed everything under the single term “tempered.”
Since this is an analysis of the PLA, I was also considering another set of phrases: “throw stones, mix in sand, dig under the walls,” referring to Mao’s countermeasures against the so-called Lin Biao clique in official party history. Xi’s purges cleverly correspond to these measures, but there wasn’t room to elaborate, so I summarized it as simply “carrot and stick.”
I think there is not enough evidence to support this claim. Perhaps you can reread this article or take a look at my previous article, 'Beyond the Whispers: Analysis, Methodology, and Pekingology.'
Wrote a thread on similar lines of analysis appearing in a recent Foreign Affairs article:
https://substack.com/@pixy1/note/c-254431406
Wow, what a tour de force. Highly illuminating and educational
FYI: As I have noted previously, there are parallels between this process and what in the early 1950s Isaiah Berlin described as an “artificial dialectic”:
https://chinaheritage.net/journal/xi-jinpings-china-stalins-artificial-dialectic/
From Joseph Torigian:
https://warontherocks.com/2026/01/obedience-ambiguity-and-punishment-the-chinese-military-at-tiananmen-revisited/
Very revealing.
That's a very good overview using good sources. Here are a few thoughts with more details:
As you mentioned, in 1979, Xi Jinping's first job was serving as secretary to Geng Biao. During that time, he was involved in editing and publishing the after-action reports of the 1979 war against Vietnam. This would give him insight into what went wrong and the scale of PLA losses during a four-week war. While doing interviews with PLA veterans from the '79 war, I noticed how not one of them ever talked about "liberating Taiwan". They have good reasons to know better than internet warriors.
In June 2001, General Liu Yazhou published in Beijing an internal book with 105 pages and the title 对台作战: 战略评估. Without explicitly stating it, he doesn't want to invade Taiwan. He distributed it to many interested people. It didn't make him popular with Xi. He also published books in Hong Kong that were not published inside China, which is unique for a PLA general. For a long time, he thought he could get away with such lone wolf behavior. He was wrong.
Thanks for the additional details. Your point about the PLA veterans makes me wonder if there’s a gap between rank-and-file veterans and the combat heroes who later rose to the top — like CMC Vice Chair Zhang Youxia, JSD Chief Liu Zhenli, and former Chief Li Zuocheng — and whether they share that same caution about war and Taiwan, or if their perspective shifted once they were the ones calling the shots.
In the case of Zhang Youxia, I think he is very much aware of how weak the PLA is. During the ’79 war, he commanded a company in the battle for Lao Cai (8th Company, 119th Regiment, 40th Inf Division, 14th Army). In 1984, during the Laoshan battle, he had risen to colonel and was at the center of that attack. He has seen a lot of fighting for months and from close. I don’t see such people stumbling into a war that is not limited, cannot be controlled, and where the PLA will be unable to react to counterstrikes on Chinese territory. Same as Liu Yazhou, he was born in 1950. It looks to me like Xi keeps him at age 75 and older in such a high position because anyone else has not even half his experience in actual warfare.
My sense is that Zhang and his cohort know how weak the PLA was, and their focus has been on addressing those specific shortcomings within a more modernized force.
On Taiwan, one school of thought holds that this cohort tends to prioritize real combat training over gray-zone activities. That’s also one analytical angle people have used to interpret He Weidong’s ouster.
Pixy: updated. Please see:
https://chinaheritage.net/journal/beyond-the-whispers-china-watching-in-a-new-era-of-pekingology/
This is brilliant. Thanks much.
This is a super sharp piece—it’s got the phrase “continuous revolution” in my head again, although there’s probably a reason Xi doesn’t use that term himself.
An impressive piece of work. Looking forward to the next installment.
Just re-read this again absolutely next level.
I wonder, at this point if we could count out the remaining active duty 上将s with our hands and feet?
Zhang youxia, Zhang shengmin, Liu Zhenli, Dong Jun for starters, but i doubt the list will be long.
Thank you. Yes, the list is still getting shorter. Bloomberg did a great interactive piece noting that at least 14 generals promoted under Xi since 2012 have vanished or come under investigation. After the parade, it should be 15—the Central Theater commander, who was supposed to lead it, is also missing.
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2025-xi-china-military-officials-purge/
just came across this, great piece of writing!
“Self-revolution aims to forge the edge”? Great.
Problem (and a glaring/howling one at that) is, what kind of an edge will it be?
Apparently, there is no puzzle, riddle, suspense, or mystery here.
Mao and Xi have already shown / demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that their brand of self-revolution can be no more or no less than double-edged, which more often than not achieves the great effect of "killing a thousand enemies at the cost of mowing down eight hundred or many more of your own((杀敌一千自伤八百或多得多)."
The always “great, glorious and correct” Party has previously made an official conclusion that Mao’s self-revolution (culminating in the Great Cultural Revolution) was a catastrophe. And there is no denying that in China today literally millions of the Chinese have arrived at exactly the same conclusion about Xi’s revolution.
I can’t help wondering what is the effect on efficiency of the military of constantly looking over your shoulder instead of out at the world?
Pixy: This is a powerful second installment in your series, though I felt that you didn’t really explain “self-revolution” itself, its origins, significance and impact at any particular length. My understanding is that, like the now well-known “Cave Dialogue” between Mao and Huang Yanpei in July 1945, “self-revolution” also has its origins in the Yan’an period, in particular at the beginning of the Rectification which was encapsulated at the time in Hu Qiaomu’s call to ‘Drop Your Pants, Cut Off Your Tail, Get in Line to Wash in Public” 脫褲子，割尾巴， 排隊洗澡… There is much to be said about this, as well as about the long history of creating/ moulding New Socialist People/Men (Stalin and Mao), Revolution in the Depths of the Soul (Lin Biao), confessional culture and control; but all of that is far beyond the scope of this short note. You might find the following to be of interest: https://chinaheritage.net/journal/drop-your-pants-the-party-wants-to-patriotise-you-all-over-again-part-i/
You’re absolutely right. Thank you for sharing that excellent article link in your comment.
What you point out is indeed crucial for understanding self-revolution, but this piece is already quite long, so I had to make editorial choices. That’s why I condensed everything under the single term “tempered.”
Since this is an analysis of the PLA, I was also considering another set of phrases: “throw stones, mix in sand, dig under the walls,” referring to Mao’s countermeasures against the so-called Lin Biao clique in official party history. Xi’s purges cleverly correspond to these measures, but there wasn’t room to elaborate, so I summarized it as simply “carrot and stick.”
I think there is not enough evidence to support this claim. Perhaps you can reread this article or take a look at my previous article, 'Beyond the Whispers: Analysis, Methodology, and Pekingology.'
https://pixy1.substack.com/p/beyond-the-whispers-analysis-methodology